GSP in the "spaghetti bowl" of trade preferences by Melchior, Arne
No. 683 – 2005
Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk 
Institutt
Norwegian Institute 
of International 
Affairs
Arne Melchior
[683] Paper
GSP in the “spaghetti bowl” of
trade preferences
Utgiver: 
Copyright:
ISSN:
Besøksadresse:
Addresse:
Internett:
E-post:
Fax:
Tel:
NUPI
© Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2005
0800 - 0018
Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må 
ikke tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tilleg-
ges Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke 
reproduseres - helt eller delvis - ved trykking, fotokopi-
ering eller på annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne.
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambrosplass 2d
Postboks 8159 Dep. 
0033 Oslo 
www.nupi.no
pub@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
[Abstract] The paper examines the relative position of GSP (tariff preferences for 
developing countries) compared to ordinary tariffs and free trade agreements in Norway, 
the EU and the USA. On average, ordinary GSP gives a tariff rebate of less than 50% in 
all countries. “Extended” GSP, given to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and others, 
implies zero tariffs in Norway and the EU, but only partial liberalisation in the USA. EU 
provides extended GSP for 119 countries, while the USA does so for 76 and Norway for 52. 
Considering the shares of trade rather than the number of countries, extended GSP covers 
5% or less of total trade in all cases, and ordinary GSP is much more important. Compared 
to tariffs in free trade agreements, ordinary GSP is inferior in the USA and the EU, but not 
too far behind in Norway. This is due to recent cuts in MFN tariffs as well as improvements 
in the GSP system of Norway. For manufacturing, Norway has low tariffs and a generous 
GSP system. This is however not the case for agriculture.
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1. Introduction1  
Due to the ever increasing number of free trade agreements (FTAs) as 
well as unilateral preference arrangements, the world trade system has 
developed into what Jagdish Bhagwati has baptized a “spaghetti bowl”.2 
This trend also led Melchior (2003) to ask whether the MFN (Most 
Favoured Nation) treatment was actually becoming the Least Favoured 
Nation treatment. In this paper, we shall undertake a more detailed 
assessment of trade preferences in the EU, USA and Norway in order to 
check the content of these propositions. 
While this paper is written as part of a study of the Norwegian GSP 
system, we cover free trade agreements (FTAs) as well since the impact 
of GSP cannot be properly grasped without comparing to the trade 
conditions under FTAs. If a large share of trade is covered by FTAs with 
better market access than under GSP, this will obviously have a bearing 
on the impact of GSP. If GSP turns out to be among the least generous 
regimes, too much of a trade-creating impact should not be expected. We 
are interested in establishing this ranking, and to quantify the relative 
difference between GSP and other trade preferences. For this purpose, 
the trade regimes of Norway, EU and the USA will be analysed.  
The GSP systems may be classified in terms of  
- country coverage; how are non-members of the WTO, and the more 
wealthy developing countries, treated? 
- differentiation between beneficiaries; all countries give better terms 
for the LDCs but also for some other countries, 
- the coverage and depth of tariff cuts; are there important exceptions 
and “sensitive” sectors? 
- mechanisms for “graduation” or withdrawal of concessions for the 
richer or more competitive countries 
- rules of origin and administrative barriers, and the extent of 
utilisation of the systems 
- criteria for differentiation related to e.g. security, environmental 
standards, labour standards etc. 
In the paper, we attempt to quantify or describe most of these elements 
but not all. We do not go into great detail on e.g. rules of origin, so it is 
mainly the tariff component that is properly quantified. The worth of 
GSP also depends on the level of contingent protection such as anti-
dumping, or quotas for textiles and clothing, or tariff rate quotas in 
agriculture, and we do not attempt to measure these elements.  
For each country, we use national sources3 for classifying the trade 
regimes, and in addition 
- trade data from the UN COMTRADE database 
                                                 
1 I thank Hege Medin and Per Botolf Maurseth for comments to an earlier draft. The 
normal disclaimer applies.  
2 We discussed with an Italian colleague whether the term is influenced by Americans 
mixing more things in  the spaghetti than customary in Italy, but apparently the 
wording refers to the “crisscrossing” of numerous different trade regimes (see 
Bhagwati and Panagariya 1997). 
3 For the EU, we frequently refer to the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
When referring to this, we use the shorthand form OJ xx.xx.xxx, where the x’s refer to 
the date of publication. 
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- (for Norway) national trade data for Norway from Statistics Norway 
- tariff data from the UNCTADs TRAINS database and the IDB/WTO 
database 
- various country data from the World Development Indicators 2004 
from the World  Bank, CIA World Factbook (for completing data 
coverage) and other sources. 
For useful reviews of the EU and U.S. GSP systems, see also UNCTAD 
(2003) and OECD (2005). 
In the following, we classify the trade regimes of Norway, EU and 
the USA for 233 countries and territories.4   
2. GSP, FTA and MFN: A classification of regimes 
Given that GSP is for developing countries, many countries are 
commonly included in all GSP systems. There are nevertheless some 
differences, since there is no unambiguous definition of developing 
countries, and the GSP donors may use different definitions. Hence the 
coverage of GSP varies across countries.  
Secondly, there is some scope for differentiating between developing 
countries within GSP systems.5 It is accepted that LDCs may be given 
better preferences than other developing countries, and we shall se that 
other forms of differentiation also exist. 
Third, the number of FTAs is increasing worldwide, and this also 
applies to the three countries studied. FTAs are important in this context 
not only because they may cover developing countries, but even more 
because the value of GSP depends on its position in the overall trade 
policy of each country. If MFN tariffs are 20% and GSP 10%, the tariff 
preference is worth less if other countries have 0% in FTAs. 
Classifying the 208 trade partners of EU-25, we obtain the following 
distribution: 
 
                                                 
4 Western Sahara is not included due to lack of data. Otherwise, the country list should 
be complete although a few minor territories could have been added (e.g. the Vatican 
and some smaller Pacific Islands). 
5 On legal aspects and criteria for differentiation, see Melchior (2005a). 
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Diagram 1: EU-25 - trade regimes for 208 countries
FTA (27)
LDC (49)
ACP not LDC (38)
Ordinary GSP 
only (51)
MFN (11)
Overseas 
countries/ 
territories (20)
Countries 
fighting drugs 12
 
 
Hence MFN conditions apply for eleven countries only. The members of 
this exclusive club are:  Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, South 
Korea, Myanmar (LDC treatment suspended temporarily), North Korea, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan and the USA.6 Except for North 
Korea, all these are WTO members. 
Free trade agreements of various kinds apply to 27 countries (in 
addition to the EU countries themselves), and ordinary GSP to 51.7 In 
addition, as many as 119 countries have extended unilateral preferences: 
- The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have zero tariffs for goods 
trade due to the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative of 2001 (OJ 
31.12.2001).  This provides for duty-free access for everything but 
arms (HS chapter 93). Arms are in fact duty-free for ACP as well as 
most free trade partners, but not for LDCs. In addition, there are 
transition periods for some sensitive agricultural goods; these are  
bananas (until 2006), sugar and rice (until 2009). As noted above, 
GSP treatment for Myanmar has been suspended. 
- 40 of the LDCs are in fact also members of the ACP (Africa, 
Caribbean, Pacific) group; currently 79 countries that are mainly 
former EU colonies. In 1974, i.e. after the GSP system of the EU was 
established, additional preferences were granted to the ACP countries 
through the Lomé Convention.  Later, it was replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreement. South Africa has its own FTA with the EU, and we 
therefore obtain 38 countries with the classification “ACP not LDC”. 
- The 20 Overseas Countries and Territories (OJ 30.11.2001) are small 
states with modest populations; in fact the combined population of 
them all is only around 1.2 million.  
                                                 
6 There are some preferential arrangements for agricultural goods for New Zealand, so 
this is a borderline case. 
7 In order to simplify, we have included three Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) under ordinary GSP, even if the regime for these 
country is legally different.  For a list of GSP beneficiaries, see OJ 1.3.2001. 
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- Countries Fighting Drugs include 11 countries in Latin America, plus 
Pakistan. In order to improve relations with Latin America, these 
countries were given extended preferences, and Pakistan was later 
added to the group.8 
The four country groups with extended preferences comprise a total of 
119 countries.  
The EU therefore gives “extended GSP” to several countries beyond 
the LDCs. This is not the case for Norway’s GSP system, and the USA is 
an intermediate case. Diagram 2 shows the U.S. distribution of trade 
regimes: 
 
Diagram 2: USAs trade regimes for 233 countries
FTA (12)
Caribbean (18)
AGOA (37)
LDC (17)
Ordinary GSP 
(52)
MFN-WTO (45)
Non-WTO (42)
FTA-Central 
America (6)
Andean (4)
 
 
For the USA, there are 76 countries with extended preferences – i.e. 
more than 40 less than for the EU, whereas the number of countries with 
ordinary GSP is 52 – i.e. similar to the EU. The gap is mainly explained 
by the fact that the USA does not automatically grant MFN treatment to 
non-members of the WTO. Many of the non-WTO countries and 
territories may therefore face tariffs much higher than MFN. At the time 
of writing (May 2005), USA has 18 free trade agreements. Central 
America is shown separately since these countries are also entitled to 
extended preferences under the Caribbean arrangements. The number of 
FTAs is smaller than for the EU, but this number is growing as the U.S. 
is negotiating more, including with the four Andean countries and South 
Africa/SACU. 
The extended preferences of the USA may briefly be summarized as 
follows9: 
- For the Caribbean countries, extended preferences have been granted 
in the form of CBERA (Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 
                                                 
8 This led India to protest against the EU regime in a WTO dispute. The Appellate 
Body supported India on important points, see Melchior (2005a). For this reason, the 
drugs regime will be abandoned when the EU GSP regime is reformed. 
9 For more details, see UNCTAD (2003), OECD (2005) and  USTR (1999).  
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1993). Some more products have been included due to CBTPA 
(Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, 2000). 
- Pending the free trade agreement under negotiation, the four Andean 
countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) have extended 
preferences through the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), in 
2001 overtaken by ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act).  
- The AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) of 2001 provides 
extended preferences for 37 African countries. In addition to AGOA, 
there is an apparel protocol giving extended preferences for clothing 
for some of the AGOA beneficiaries, subject to certain conditions. 
- In Diagram 2, only 17 countries are included in the LDC category. 
Out of the 50 LDCs, the remaining 33 are covered by AGOA (24), 
non-WTO treatment (five; i.e. East Timor, Liberia, Sudan, Samoa, 
Laos), in addition to Haiti (Caribbean preferences), Afghanistan 
(FTA), Maldives and Myanmar (MFN-WTO). Hence the USA does 
not strictly adhere to the UN list of LDCs, but modifies this for own 
purposes. The LDCs receive extended GSP as part of the U.S. GSP 
system.  
Compared to these systems, the Norwegian GSP system is much more 
limited when it comes to providing extended preferences beyond LDCs. 
This is shown in Diagram 3. 
  
Diagram 3: Norway's trade regimes for 233 countries
LDCs (49)
Botswana and 
Namibia (2)
FTAs (44)
Ordinary GSP 
(100)
MFN-WTO (13)
MFN, non-WTO 
(25)
 
 
Hence in the case of Norway, extended preferences are given mainly to 
the LDCs; only Botswana and Namibia are in addition. Myanmar has 
been excluded since 1997; hence only 49 LDCs are covered. Ordinary 
GSP covers twice as many countries as for the EU and the USA; 100 
versus 52. As part of the Western European free trade area, Norway has 
many free trade areas (44). Note that in Diagram 1 we did not count 
members of EU-25; for an individual EU country we may add 24 to the 
FTA category – bringing the EU number of FTAs up to 51. Hence the 
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EU is still the champion of regional integration, but the EFTA countries 
follow not far behind.  
Regarding non-WTO countries, Norway is in an intermediate 
position compared to EU and the USA. Out of the 25 countries in this 
category, the EU gives GSP to ten, including the eight transition 
countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The USA gives GSP to 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. The Norwegian GSP system does 
not cover these countries. 
3. The share of trade for various regimes 
Hence trade preferences of various sorts cover a large number of 
countries in all three cases. Many of the beneficiaries are however very 
small economies, so the share of trade covered by the different regimes 
is radically different from the share of countries. Diagram 4 shows this 
for the EU:   
 
Diagram 4: EU trade regimes - shares of extra-EU imports 
into the EU-25 countries, 2003
FTAs 22.8%
LDC 1.4%
ACP not LDC 
2.2%
Overseas 0.2%
Drugs 1.6%
GSP only 
33.6%
MFN 38.2%
  
 
While countries with extended preferences account for more than half of 
the countries, they accounted for only 5.4% of the imports of EU-25 
countries in 2003. In trade coverage, MFN is much more important than 
the small number of countries would suggest. Observe also that ordinary 
GSP is much more important than extended preferences if we consider 
the amount of trade covered.  Table 1 provides figures for all the three 
donors. For the EU, we present figures including intra-EU trade (i.e. with 
51 FTAs) and with only extra-EU trade (i.e. 27 FTAs). The diagram 
above shows only extra-EU-25 trade, and hence the share of FTAs is 
much lower than with intra-EU trade. 
 
                                                                                   GSP in the “spaghetti bowl” of trade preferences       7 
 
 
Table 1: Norway, EU and the USA; % shares of imports covered 
by different trade regimes (using 2003 import data) 
 Norway 
EU – 
individual 
country 
EU 
together USA 
Free trade agreements 74.2 72.5 22.8 33.0 
Extended preferences 0.7 1.9 5.4 4.0 
Regular preferences 10.8 12.0 33.6 9.5 
MFN-WTO 12.0 13.6 38.1 51.9 
Other 2.4 0.0 0.1 1.6 
Sum 100 100 100 100 
 
In all cases, extended preferences account for a modest share of trade, 
and regular preferences are more important. MFN-WTO trade constitutes 
more than half of U.S. imports, and 38% for the EU if only extra-EU 
trade is considered. If intra-EU trade is included, however, the MFN-
WTO share drops to 14% for the EU, close to the 12% figure for 
Norway. 
For the Norwegian GSP regime, this raises the issues such as: 
- Should GSP be given to more non-WTO countries, including the 
former Soviet Union? 
- Should “extended GSP” be given to more countries, as for EU and 
the USA? 
- Should high-income countries be “graduated” from GSP? 
In Melchior (2005a) the answer is affirmative for all three. The main 
argument for extended GSP is to stimulate more competition and include 
countries with larger supply capacity than the LDCs.  
4. Tariff levels: Between the Most and the Least Favoured 
Nation treatment? 
Due to the extension of free trade agreements and preferences, Melchior 
(2003) asks whether MFN is actually the Least rather than the Most 
Favoured Nation treatment. In order to assess whether this is true, we 
need to quantify the difference between trade regimes. For this purpose, 
we use tariffs for trade in goods as an indicator.10 The different trade 
regimes also differ in other respects, but since GSP is mainly about 
goods tariffs, this choice is appropriate here. We shall revert to some 
other aspects of the preferential trade regimes, such as graduation, rules 
of origin and the like.  
For the comparisons undertaken, we only use ad valorem tariffs. 
Some tariff lines, especially for agriculture, but in the USA also for 
textiles and clothing, are specific (some value per quantity unit). Table 2 
shows the proportion of ad valorem tariffs and the averages of ad 
valorem MFN applied tariffs. For the purpose, we have divided goods 
into broad classes, with classification provided in Appendix Table A1. 
 
                                                 
10 Data are taken from the TRAINS database of UNCTAD. 
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Table 2: Tariff lines and average ad valorem tariffs for USA, Norway and EU 
 USA (2004) Norway (2003) EU (2003) 
Product group Tariff lines 
% ad 
valorem
Tariff 
average
Tariff
lines 
% ad 
valorem
Tariff 
average 
Tariff 
lines 
% ad 
valorem
Tariff 
average
Agriculture 1648 56 9.3 1239 41 11.6 4709 40 10.2
Fish 190 95 2.1 257 98 0.0 737 100 11.8
Mineral products and metals 1986 97 1.9 1385 100 0.0 2498 100 2.8
Chemical products 1931 99 3.6 1158 99 0.5 2574 99 5.2
Leather and fur products 222 100 4.3 95 100 0.0 176 100 2.9
Textiles and footwear 1191 94 8.0 776 100 0.5 1412 100 7.1
Clothing 568 89 10.8 289 100 11.5 471 100 11.7
Other manufactures 2710 92 1.9 1927 100 0.0 3306 99 2.7
Arms and ammunition 40 90 1.1 27 100 0.0 30 100 2.3
All goods 10486 89 4.3 7153 89 1.6 15913 82 5.6
Non-agriculture 8838 97 5.7 5922 100 0.7 11218 99 4.8
  
All three countries use specific tariffs extensively for agriculture, and the 
USA also uses such tariffs for some other goods; especially textiles and 
clothing. In Melchior (2005b), ad valorem equivalents for Norway are 
calculated and show a simple tariff average in agriculture in the range 
73-103%. With more than 600 specific tariffs, this is sufficient to raise 
the total Norwegian tariff average above that of the EU or the USA. 
These countries also have specific tariffs in agriculture, but the averages 
for these are, according to Böuet et al. (2004) closer to 10 than to 100. 
Tariff averages including only ad valorem tariff in agriculture therefore 
give a wrong basis for comparison. Figures for agriculture and for the 
total including agriculture in Table 2 does therefore not give an accurate 
representation of the difference between countries, since the Norwegian 
agricultural protection is hidden.  
For this reason, we also show in Table 2 tariff averages for all non-
agricultural goods. Based on this, we may conclude that: 
- For non-agricultural goods, Norway has clearly lower MFN tariffs 
than EU and the USA. In fact, Norway has eliminated tariffs fully for 
five out of the nine sectors. For chemicals and textiles, very few 
tariffs remain. For chemical goods, remaining tariffs are related to 
agriculture (HS Chapter 35, proteins etc.). 
- For all three countries, agriculture and clothing are “sensitive” 
sectors with higher MFN tariffs. For EU and the US, the textile sector 
is also sensitive, and for the EU we may add fish to this list.11 
Due to the specific tariffs, we cannot give an accurate comparison across 
countries. Hence in spite of Table 2, Norway is not in the position to 
celebrate its liberal-mindedness: This applies to manufacturing only. For 
agriculture, Norway is clearly the most protective among the three. If 
                                                 
11 Observe also EU has a detailed classification of goods with almost 16 000 items at 
the 10-digit level, compared to Norway with 7153 (8-digit) only and the USA between 
these extremes. Complex national classifications beyond the international common 6-
digit level (with a bit more than 5000 products in the latest version) may act as a non-
tariff barrier.  
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this is taken into account, it is likely that the overall tariff average is 
highest for Norway – although we do not present such calculations here. 
In spite if this ambiguity about the comparison across countries, the 
ad valorem tariffs provide a useful tool for ranking the multitude of trade 
regimes for each country. Diagrams 5, 6 and 7 present average MFN 
tariffs for all goods across different regimes for the three countries. 12 
 
Diagram 5: Tariff levels for Norway's trade partners 2003
Calculations from TRAINS data.
1.58
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Botsw ana-Namibia
LDC
Simple average (%), ad valorem tariffs
 
                                                 
12 Since we use simple averages, it should be observed that trade-weighted averages 
could change the levels. For Norway, it can e.g. be shown that the trade-weighted tariff 
average for developing countries is higher than the simple average, due to higher tariffs 
are higher for clothing. For comparing the “depth” of different regimes for each 
country, however, we believe the simple average may be used. 
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Diagram 6: EU's tariff hierarchy, 2003
Calculated from TRAINS tariff data.
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Diagram 7: Tariff levels for U.S. trade partners, 2003
Note: Calculated from TRAINS tariff data.
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Table 4 shows average tariffs for the different types of regimes, in order 
to illustrate the ranking shown in the diagrams: 
 
Table 4: The hierarchy of trade regimes in the EU, 
USA and Norway (average of ad valorem tariffs) 
 EU USA Norway 
MFN-WTO 5.60 4.26 1.58 
GSP 2.84 2.82 0.90 
LDC 0.00 1.98 0.00 
Extended GSP 0.26 1.80 0.12 
FTAs 1.30 0.46 0.95 
Expressed in % of the MFN tariff: 
 EU USA Norway 
MFN-WTO 100 100 100 
GSP 51 66 57 
LDC 0 46 0 
Extended GSP 5 42 8 
FTAs 23 11 60 
 
The pattern that emerges from this, is that: 
- In all three countries, ordinary GSP implies on average less than 50% 
tariff cuts and the average rate is similar – with the smallest cuts in 
the USA. 
- In Europe (EU and Norway), extended GSP is generous by providing 
almost complete tariff elimination, but in the USA this is not the 
case. The difference viz. the USA is however exaggerated here, since 
AGOA includes non-automatic additional preferences for textiles that 
have not been taken into account in the figures above. 
12      Arne Melchior 
  
- For the USA, FTAs is the most beneficial tariff regime, while in 
Norway, FTAs are not much better than ordinary GSP. The EU is in-
between.  
As shown by Melchior (2005b), including specific tariffs in agriculture 
does not change this ranking of regimes for Norway very much. When 
comparing tariff levels across countries, however, the picture is changed 
by agriculture; the low tariffs for Norway in Table 4 mainly reflect 
manufacturing and the more liberalized parts of agriculture. 
Diagrams 5-7 clearly show the strong differentiation between 
different trade regimes. For Norway, there are mainly three steps on the 
ladder, but for the USA, there are 12. And for the EU, there is a 
continuous stairs leading to the top, where we find the extended 
preferences to ACP, LDCs, Overseas Countries and Territories, and 
Countries Fighting Drugs.  
Hence there is really, particularly for the EU, a “spaghetti bowl” of 
trade preferences. It also demonstrates that the MFN trade conditions are 
at the bottom, as the Least Favoured Nations. Only for the USA it is 
possible to sink lower: Tariffs may be considerably higher for countries 
that are not members of the WTO. If countries are not given MFN status 
by the USA, they face tariffs that are on average 33%!  Although not 
shown in Diagram 7, this may bring some relief to the MFN countries. 
5. Partial tariff cuts in sensitive sectors 
The depth of average tariff cuts is determined partly by the product 
coverage of tariff cuts, and partly by the depth of cuts for each tariff line. 
As an illustration, consider that we have 10 products with 10% MFN 
tariffs each, so the tariff average is also 10%. Now consider that the GSP 
tariff average is 6%. This may either be obtained by cutting all tariffs to 
6%, or by cutting four tariffs to zero while the other six remain at 10%. c 
Partial tariff cuts are more common in sensitive sectors, e.g. agriculture 
in Norway and agriculture, fish, textiles and clothing in the EU. The US 
tends to provide full tariff elimination if a tariff line is included; hence 
GSP is limited more by the product coverage. This has also been the case 
for clothing in Norway, where GSP tariffs remain high for some goods 
but are cut to zero for others.  
Diagrams 8-10 show the depth of GSP tariff cuts for different 
sectors. 
 
                                                                                   GSP in the “spaghetti bowl” of trade preferences       13 
 
Diagram 8: GSP versus MFN tariffs - EU 2003
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Diagram 9: GSP versus MFN tariffs, USA 2004
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Diagram 10: GSP versus MFN tariffs - Norway 2003
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For the sensitive sectors, tariff cuts under ordinary GSP are quite modest 
in the EU as well as the USA. This also applies to agriculture in Norway, 
but for clothing the Norwegian tariff cuts are deeper.13 To some extent, 
the remaining tariffs for clothing in Norway constitute a historical 
inheritance; textile quotas are now long gone and there are no more 
sharp conflicts over textile and clothing protection. In the EU and the 
USA, there are currently fierce debates about new protection in the wake 
of textile quota elimination from 1 January 2005. Norway is past this 
stage, and further tariff cuts for clothing are not likely to cause political 
rows. For agriculture, however, there is a deep conflict involved.  
Corresponding to their unilateral character, the GSP systems of the 
EU and the USA are determined for a set time period. The current GSP 
system of the USA runs until the end of 2006, while the EU system is 
renewed for 10-year intervals and is about to be replaced by a new 
version.  The EU preferences for LDCs are without any time limit, and 
this also applies to the U.S. CBERA preferences for the Caribbean 
(OECD 2005, 71). 
6. Renewal of the EU GSP system – a brief note 
The GSP system of the EU has since its first vintage in 1971 been 
characterised by a distinction between “sensitive” products with small or 
non-existent tariff reductions, and non-sensitive products with full or far-
reaching tariff elimination. The extent of fine-tuning and the methods for 
                                                 
13 In Melchior (2005b) it is shown that if specific tariffs are included, tariff cuts in 
agriculture are only 10-15%. 
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differentiation have developed over time, towards a simpler and better 
system. Before 1995, imports of sensitive goods were subject to tariff 
quotas (i.e. with tariff reductions applying to a limited quantity only), or 
tariff ceilings (so than ordinary tariffs were reinstated if imports 
exceeded some quantity). Tariff quotas could be allocated between EU 
members as well as beneficiary countries – giving rise to a very complex 
system.14 
From 1995, tariff quotas and ceilings were abolished. Tariff 
reductions were given at five different levels (0, 15, 30, 65, 100%) 
according to product sensitivity. A new safeguard clause was added, so 
that tariffs could be reinstated in so-called “exceptional circumstances”.   
The version of the EU GSP system (OJ 1.3.2001) described in this 
paper has applied since 1.1.2002. It was envisaged for 2002-4 but was 
extended until the end of 2005. After a prolonged battle in the EU 
Council of Ministers, the proposal for a new regime has recently been 
adopted (OJ 30.6.2005). Most aspects of the new regime will enter into 
force from 1.1.2006 and last until end-2008, but the drugs regime was 
abandoned already from 1 July 2005.15 16  
In terms of product coverage and the depth of tariff cuts, the new 
regime will not be a revolution, but some improvements are envisaged: 
In the current system, tariff cuts for sensitive products are 3.5 percentage 
points, so that e.g. a 10% tariff is reduced to 6.5%. For textiles and 
clothing, the cut is 20% of the tariff so the new rate would be 8%. In the 
new system, these rules are maintained17, but the lists of goods included , 
as well as sensitive goods, has been revised. According to the EU 
Commission, another 300 products are included; mainly agriculture and 
fish products. Some specific tariffs for sensitive goods are to be reduced 
by 30%, and this is an improvement especially for agriculture. 
A potentially important reform is the EU plan to base the rules of 
origin on value added criteria rather than relying on processing rules. If 
this eliminates the “double processing requirement” for clothing, it will 
be an important reform. Especially for small countries, it is difficult to 
have an own yarn and fabric industry, which is necessary to obtain GSP 
for clothing (see also Brenton and Manchin 2003, Mattoo et al. 2003). 
From the EU descriptions of the new rules, it is not immediately clear 
whether this requirement would be abandoned. In the AGOA apparel 
                                                 
14 For a review of the early GSP system of the EU, see Peers (1995). 
15 See Melchior (2005c) concerning the WTO dispute about the drugs regime. 
16 The EU Commission had proposed that the new system should enter into force on 
1.4.2005. This was announced as a measure to assist countries hit by the Tsunami (see 
communication by the EU Commission of 10.2.2005, http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/february/tradoc_121410.pdf).  In March 2005, the EU 
Council of Ministers however failed to agree on the new system, so more discussions 
were needed before the new system could be adopted. Hence the Tsunami victims has 
to wait a bit more for the relatively modest improvements offered by the new system. 
For general information about the EU GSP system, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/gspguide.htm. 
17 See EUR-Lex document 52005PC0043, Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences/* COM/2005/0043 Final – CNS 
2004/0242. 
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protocol, there is an exemption from the double processing requirement 
(see Olarreaga and Özden 2005).   
7. The Norwegian GSP system: Developments over time 
The relative equality of GSP and FTA tariff levels in the Norwegian 
system has not been present historically. Until the 1990s, FTAs in 
Europe had lower tariffs, and developing countries were also subject to 
textile quotas under the MFA (Multifibre Agreement). Quotas were 
gradually removed throughout the 1990s, and during the last years, there 
have been strong changes in the tariff regime. Diagram 11 compares 
Norwegian tariffs for clothing in 1988, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002 and 
2005. 
For the last four years, we also show trade-weighted tariff averages – 
using Norway’s imports from low and lower-middle income countries as 
weights.18 Since tariffs are higher for economically more important 
items, the trade-weighted averages are higher than the simple averages. 
 
 
Diagram 11: Norwegian tariffs for clothing 1988-2005
(HS Chapters 61, 62, simple and weighted averages) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1988 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Ta
rif
f a
ve
ra
ge
 (%
) MFN-weighted
MFN
GSP-weighted
GSP
LDC
EU, EFTA
 
 
While tariffs for LDCs and the European FTAs were zero already in 
1988, MFN and GSP tariffs were high. From 1995 onwards, tariffs were 
reduced due to the Uruguay Round. After 1999, however, Norway has 
undertaken autonomous cuts in MFN applied tariffs, and also extended 
the product coverage of GSP. During this period, there has been a radical 
change so that the relative position of ordinary GSP has improved 
considerably. The Uruguay Round explains only a little of this; the rest 
has occurred because of autonomous decisions by the Norwegian 
Government. 
 
                                                 
18 For this purpose, we use import data from COMTRADE at the 6-digit level. Tariffs 
are aggregated from the 8- to the 6-digit level by using simple averages, before the 
trade-weighting is carried out.  
                                                                                   GSP in the “spaghetti bowl” of trade preferences       17 
 
8. Concluding comments 
The analysis above shows that for the three countries covered, ordinary 
GSP on average leads to tariff cuts between 1/3 and 50%. Extended GSP 
is more valuable, especially in Norway and the EU where it is equivalent 
to more or less complete tariff elimination.  
GSP benefits may however be nullified by other restrictions. In 
addition to the rules of origin mentioned above, tariff benefits may be 
undermined in other ways: 
- The USA as well as the EU are frequent users of contingent 
protection such as anti-dumping.  
- The USA and the EU also practice product graduation (eliminating 
GSP when imports from particular countries exceed certain 
thresholds) as a regular feature of their GSP. This also creates 
uncertainty that may limit trade. 
- Country graduation or exemptions due to various standards are also 
used in the GSP of the big powers, but not in Norway. 
Hence on the whole, the GSP system of Norway may be considered as 
more generous than the ones of the EU and the USA. There is, however, 
a very big footnote, and its name in agriculture. The liberal-mindedness 
of Norway in the field of manufacturing is severely compensated by its 
restrictive trade policy for agriculture. Birdsall and Roodman (2003) 
were right when they used this to criticize Norway’s “development-
friendliness”; although their estimate on trade protection in Norway’s 
agriculture (from Cline 2002) was inflated.  
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Table A1: Classification of sectors 
Sector HS numbers included 
Agriculture Chapters 1-2 
Chapters 4-14 
1501-1503 
1505-1602 
Chapters 17-24 
Arms Chapter 93 
Chemicals Chapters 28-39 
Clothing Chapters 61-62 
Fish Chapter 3 
1504 
1603-1605 
Leather Chapters 41-43 
Other manufacturing Chapter 49 
Chapters 82-92 
Chapters 94-96 
Mineral products Chapters 25-27 
Chapter 40 
Chapters 44-48 
Chapters 68-81 
Textiles Chapters 50-60 
Chapters 63-67 
 
